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Abstract
Autonomous agents acting in the real-world often operate
based on models that ignore certain aspects of the environ-
ment. The incompleteness of any given model—handcrafted
or machine acquired—is inevitable due to practical limita-
tions of any modeling technique for complex real-world set-
tings. Due to the limited fidelity of its model, an agent’s ac-
tions may have unexpected, undesirable consequences dur-
ing execution. Learning to recognize and avoid such negative
side effects of the agent’s actions is critical to improving the
safety and reliability of autonomous systems. This emerging
research topic is attracting increased attention due to the in-
creased deployment of AI systems and their broad societal
impacts. This article provides a comprehensive overview of
different forms of negative side effects and the recent re-
search efforts to address them. We identify key characteris-
tics of negative side effects, highlight the challenges in avoid-
ing negative side effects, and discuss recently developed ap-
proaches, contrasting their benefits and limitations. We con-
clude with a discussion of open questions and suggestions for
future research directions.
A world populated with intelligent and autonomous sys-
tems that simplify our lives is gradually becoming a reality.
These systems are autonomous in the sense that they can
devise a sequence of actions to achieve some given objec-
tives or goals, without human intervention. Such systems are
deeply integrated into our daily lives through various appli-
cations such as mobile health monitoring (Sim 2019), in-
telligent tutoring (Folsom-Kovarik, Sukthankar, and Schatz
2013), self-driving cars (Zilberstein 2015), and clinical deci-
sion making (Bennett and Hauser 2013). This broad deploy-
ment brings along new challenges and increased responsi-
bility for designers of AI systems, particularly ensuring that
these systems operate as expected when deployed in the real-
world. Despite recent advances in artificial intelligence and
machine learning, there are no ways to assure that systems
will always “do the right thing” when operating in the open
world (Lakkaraju et al. 2017).
For example, consider an autonomous vehicle (AV) that
was carefully designed and tested for safety aspects such as
yielding to pedestrians and conforming to traffic rules. When
deployed, the AV may not slow down when driving through
puddles and splash water on nearby pedestrians, which is un-
desirable. Another documented example of undesirable be-
havior in autonomous vehicles is the vehicle swerving left
and right multiple times to localize itself for active lane-
keeping. During this process, the vehicle rarely prompted
the driver to take control. This behavior, especially on curvy
and hilly roads, can startle the driver or cause panic (Insur-
ance Institute for Highway Safety 2018).
Such undesirable behaviors have been reported in many
other contexts in which AI systems are deployed. For ex-
ample, robot vacuum cleaners are becoming increasingly
popular and they have a simple task—to remove dirt from
the floor. Undesirable behaviors may occur even when per-
forming relatively simple tasks. A robot vacuum cleaner in
Florida ran over animal feces in the house and continued its
cleaning cycle, smearing the mess around the house (Solon
2016). In an extreme case in South Korea, a robot vacuum
cleaner locked into the hair of a woman who was sleeping
on the floor, mistaking her hair for dust (McCurry 2015).
A key factor affecting an agent’s performance is its
knowledge of the environment in which it is situated. In
these examples, the agent was performing its task, perhaps
optimally with respect to the information provided to it, but
there were serious negative side effects to the agent’s ac-
tions. In the AV example, driving fast through puddles is
optimal when optimizing travel time. The side effects are
due to the limited scope of the agent’s model, not account-
ing for the undesirability of splashing water on pedestrians.
In practice, it is not feasible to anticipate all possible nega-
tive side effects and accurately encode them in the model at
design time. Due to the practical limitations of data collec-
tion and model specification, agents operating in the open
world often rely on incomplete knowledge of their target en-
vironment. This may lead to unexpected, undesirable con-
sequences whose severity ranges from mild and tolerable
events to safety-critical failures. Addressing the potential
undesirable behaviors of autonomous systems is critical to
support long-term autonomy and ensure that a deployed AI
system is reliable.
There have been numerous recent studies focused on
the broad challenge of building safe and reliable AI sys-
tems (Amodei et al. 2016; Russell, Dewey, and Tegmark
2015; Saria and Subbaswamy 2019; Thomas et al. 2019).
Here, we examine the particular problem of identifying and
mitigating the impacts of undesirable side effects of an
agent’s actions when operating in the open world. We do
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Figure 1: Negative side effects of an agent’s behavior.
sult from intentional adversarial attack on the system (Big-
gio and Roli 2018; Cao et al. 2019).
Negative side effects are undesired effects of an agent’s
actions that occur in addition to the agent’s intended
effects when operating in the open world. (Figure 1).
Negative side effects occur because the agent’s model
and objective function focus on some aspects of the en-
vironment, but its operation could impact additional as-
pects of the environment. Overcoming negative side effects
is an emerging area that is attracting increased attention
within the AI community (Amodei et al. 2016; Hadfield-
Menell et al. 2017; Hibbard 2012; Krakovna et al. 2019;
Russell 2017; Turner, Hadfield-Menell, and Tadepalli 2020;
Saisubramanian, Kamar, and Zilberstein 2020; Shah et al.
2019; Zhang, Durfee, and Singh 2018). The problem of neg-
ative side effects in AI is related to the value alignment
problem, which examines the unsafe behavior of an agent
when its objective is unintentionally misspecified and is not
aligned with human values (Hadfield-Menell et al. 2016;
Russell 2017). While misaligned values may lead to negative
side effects, the inverse is not necessarily true. That is, neg-
ative side effects can occur even in settings where the agent
optimizes legitimate objectives that align with the user’s
goals, due to incomplete knowledge and distributional shift.
For example, while driving in Boston, AVs that are pro-
grammed to not run into obstacles were stopped by the local
breed of unflappable seagulls standing on the street (Coren
2018). Not running into obstacles is well-aligned with the
users’ intentions and objectives, but there are side effects
because the agent lacks knowledge that it can edge to startle
the birds and then continue driving. In fact, this knowledge
was later added to the system to resolve this problem.
Design decisions that may be innocuous during initial
testing may have a significant impact when a system is
widely deployed. Certainly, some negative side effects could
be anticipated or detected during system development and
appropriate mechanisms to mitigate their impacts could be
implemented prior to deployment. We focus in this article
on negative side effects that are discovered when the system
is deployed, due to a variety of factors such as unanticipated
domain characteristics, cultural differences among the target
user and development team, or unanticipated consequences
of system or software upgrade. For example, the issue of a
Roomba locking into the hair of a person lying on the floor
Property Property Values
Severity Ranges from mild to safety-critical
Reversibility Reversible or irreversible
Avoidability Avoidable or unavoidable
Frequency Common or rare
Stochasticity Deterministic or probabilistic
Observability Full, partial, or unobserved
Exclusivity Prevent task completion or not
Table 1: Taxonomy of negative side effects.
emerged only after the system was deployed in Asia.
The severity of negative side effects may range from mild
to safety-critical failures. Often, the discussions around the
risk of encountering negative side effects have highlighted
catastrophic events. While these discussions are critical and
essential, AI systems in general are carefully designed and
tested for such failures before deployment. With the increas-
ing growth in the capabilities and deployment of AI systems,
it is equally important to address the negative side effects
that are not catastrophic, but have significant impacts. Such
side effects occur more frequently but are often overlooked,
particularly when the only remedy available is to remove
the product and develop a new version that can avoid the
undesired behavior. Hence, providing end users the tools to
identify and mitigate the impacts of negative side effects is
critical in shaping how users view, interact, collaborate, and
trust AI systems.
The rest of this article identifies key characteristics of
negative side effects, highlights the challenges in overcom-
ing negative side effects, and discusses the recent research
progress in this area. To promote a better understanding of
the prevalence of negative side effects and to provide com-
mon test cases for the research community, we have created
a public repository that allows AI researchers to report new
cases. We conclude the article with a discussion of open
questions to encourage future research in this area.
Taxonomy of Negative Side Effects
We introduce a taxonomy of negative side effects, outlined
in Table 1. Understanding the characteristics of negative side
effects helps design better solution approaches to detect and
mitigate their impacts in deployed systems.
Severity: The severity of negative side effects ranges from
mild side effects that can be largely ignored to safety-critical
failures that require suspension of the deployment of the sys-
tem. Safety-critical side effects are typically addressed by
redesigning the model and hence require extensive evalua-
tion before redeployment. An example of a safety-critical
side effect is an autonomous vehicle failing to detect a con-
struction worker’s hand gestures (Crane, Logue, and Pilz
2017). We conjecture that many negative side effects lie
in the middle with significant impacts that require atten-
tion, but not sufficiently critical to suspend the service. An
autonomous vehicle that does not slow down when going
through shallow puddles can cause significant impacts, but
those are unlikely to be considered sufficiently critical to
roll-back its deployment, particularly if mechanisms are pro-
vided to mitigate the negative impacts. Addressing such side
effects without suspension of service requires agent adapta-
tion and online planning.
Reversibility: Side effects are reversible if the impact can be
reversed or negated, either by the agent causing it or via ex-
ternal intervention. For example, breaking a vase is an irre-
versible side effect, regardless of the agent’s skills (Amodei
et al. 2016). Side effects such as leaving marks on a wall can
be fixed by repainting it, but the agent may require external
assistance to achieve that. The prior works have proposed
solutions mainly to address irreversible negative side effects.
Some of these techniques can handle reversible negative side
effects with minimal or no changes.
Avoidability: In some problems, it may be impossible to
avoid the negative side effects during the course of the
agent’s operation to complete its assigned task, thereby in-
troducing a trade-off between performing its assigned task
and avoiding the side effects. For example, the side effects
of driving through puddles are unavoidable if all roads lead-
ing to the destination have puddles. Addressing unavoidable
negative side effects requires a principled approach to bal-
ance the trade-off between avoiding side effects and opti-
mizing the achievement of the assigned task.
Frequency: The frequency of occurrence of negative side
effects depends on the environmental conditions and the ac-
tion plan. Certain negative side effects may occur rarely,
considering all use cases, but may occur frequently for a
small subset of cases. A robot pushing a box over a rug may
dirty it as a negative side effect. This is an example of a fre-
quently occurring negative side effect when the domain of
operation is largely covered with a rug. Much of the existing
literature focuses on frequently occurring side effects since
they are easy to identify and important to address. The fre-
quency of occurrence, however, could impact the approach
to identify negative side effects and the corresponding miti-
gation approach.
Stochasticity: The occurrence of negative side effects may
be deterministic or probabilistic. Deterministic side effects
always occur when some action preconditions arise in the
open world. Side effects are probabilistic when their occur-
rence is not certain even when the right preconditions arise.
For example, there may be a small probability that a robot
may accidentally slide and scratch the wall while pushing
a box, but that undesired effect may happen only 20% of
the times the robot slips. Solution approaches designed to
handle deterministic side effects can often be extended to
stochastic settings, and vice versa, with little or no modifi-
cations.
Observability: The agent’s observability of the conditions
that may trigger a negative side effect or the actual negative
effects on the environment are generally determined by the
agent’s state representation and sensory input. Negative side
effects may be fully observable, partially observable, or even
unobserved by the agent. Observing a side effect is different
from identifying or recognizing the impact as a side effect.
For example, the agent may observe the scratch it made on
the wall but may not recognize that it is undesirable, and as
a result may not try to avoid it. Observability is a critical
factor when learning to avoid negative side effects. When an
external authority provides feedback to the agent, it may be
sufficient for the agent to observe the conditions that trigger
the negative side effect. However, when an agent may need
to identify negative side effects on its own, it needs more
complex general knowledge about the open world.
Exclusivity: Negative side effects may prevent the agent
from completing its assigned task. This category is relatively
easier to identify. Often, however, the side effects negatively
impact the environment without preventing the agent from
completing its assigned task. Such side effects are typically
difficult to identify at design time. Much of the current re-
search on avoiding negative side effects focuses on side ef-
fects that do not prevent the agent from completing its pri-
mary task.
Challenges in Avoiding Negative Side Effects
The challenges in avoiding negative side effects broadly
stem from the difficulty in obtaining knowledge about side
effects a priori, gathering user preferences to understand
their tolerance for side effects, and balancing the potential
trade-off between completing the task and avoiding the side
effects.
Model imprecision Agents designed to operate in the
open world are either trained in a simulator or operate based
on models created by a designer or generated automatically
using data. Regardless of how much effort goes into the sys-
tem design and how much data is available for training and
testing, it is generally infeasible to obtain a perfect descrip-
tion of the environment. Practical challenges in model speci-
fication, such as the qualification and ramification problems,
and computational complexity consideration often cause the
agent to reason based on models that do not represent all the
relevant details in the open world (Dietterich 2017). Simula-
tors also suffer from this drawback, as they are also built by
designers, resulting in mismatches between a simulator and
the actual environment (Ramakrishnan et al. 2019). As a re-
sult of reasoning with incomplete information, agents may
not consistently behave as intended, leading to unexpected
and costly errors, or may completely fail in complex set-
tings.
There are three key reasons why the agent may not have
prior knowledge about the negative side effects of its actions.
First, identifying negative side effects a priori is inherently
challenging. As a result, this information is often lacking in
the agent’s model. Second, many AI systems are deployed
in a variety of settings, which may be different from the en-
vironment used in training and testing of the agent. This dis-
tributional shift may cause negative side effects and is dif-
ficult to assess during the design process. Third, negative
side effects in many settings arise due to user preference vi-
olation. It is generally difficult to precisely learn or encode
human preferences and account for individual or cultural dif-
ferences.
Techniques such as model update after deployment to
minimize side effects and building more realistic simula-
tors (Dosovitskiy et al. 2017) are some of the promising di-
rections to handle side effects due to model imprecision.
Feedback collection An agent that is unaware of the side
effects of its actions can gather this information through
various feedback mechanisms from users or through au-
tonomous exploration and model revisions. Though learn-
ing from feedbacks produces good results in many prob-
lems (Lakkaraju et al. 2017; Ramakrishnan et al. 2019;
Saisubramanian, Kamar, and Zilberstein 2020; Zhang, Dur-
fee, and Singh 2018; Zhang, Durfee, and Singh 2020;
Basich et al. 2020), there are three main challenges in
employing this approach in real-world systems. First, the
learning process may not be sample efficient or may re-
quire feedbacks in a certain format, such as correcting the
agent policy by providing alternate actions for execution,
to be sample efficient. Feedback collection in general is
an expensive process, particularly when the feedback for-
mat requires constant human oversight or imposes signifi-
cant cognitive overload on the user. Second, the feedbacks
may be biased or delayed or both, which in turn affects
the agent’s learning process. Finally, it is generally as-
sumed that the agent uses human-interpretable representa-
tions for querying and feedback collection, but there may
be mismatches between the models of the agent and human.
There are some recent efforts towards addressing the prob-
lem of sample efficiency in learning (Buckman et al. 2018;
Wang et al. 2016) and investigating the impact of bias
in feedback for agent learning (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018;
Saisubramanian, Kamar, and Zilberstein 2020). Identifying
and evaluating human-interpretable state-action representa-
tions for querying humans is largely an open problem.
Managing side-effect tradeoffs When negative side ef-
fects are unavoidable and interfere with the performance of
the agent’s assigned task, there is a trade-off between com-
pleting the task efficiently and avoiding the negative side
effects. In an extreme case, it may be impossible for the
agent to achieve its goal without creating negative side ef-
fects. How far should an agent deviate from its optimal plan
in order to minimize the impacts of negative side effects?
Balancing this trade-off requires user feedback since it de-
pends on their tolerance for negative side effects. This can be
challenging when the agent’s objective and the side effects
are measured in different units.
Approaches to Mitigate Negative Side Effects
This section reviews the emerging approaches to mitigating
the impacts of negative side effects. Table 2 summarizes the
characteristics of side effects handled by each one of the
methods we mention.
Model and policy update The occurrence of negative
side effects in a system depends on the agent’s trajectory,
which is determined by its policy derived using its reasoning
model. Hence, a natural approach to mitigate negative side
effects is to update the model such that the agent’s policy
avoids negative side effects as much as possible. When the
side effects are severe, causing safety-critical failures, the
model update may include significant changes such as re-
design of the reward function. Hadfield-Menell et al. (2017)
address such a setting where the negative side effects oc-
cur due to unintentional misspecification of rewards by the
designer. The agent is assumed to be aware of a possible
reward misspecification. The agent learns the true reward
function by treating the designed reward function as an indi-
cator of the intended reward. The agent infers the reward us-
ing inverse reinforcement learning techniques. As acknowl-
edged by the authors, this approach may not be scalable to
large, complex settings.
Redesigning the reward function may degrade the agent’s
performance with respect to its assigned task and hence re-
quires exhaustive evaluation before redeploying the agent.
This could be very expensive and likely require suspen-
sion of operation until the newly derived policies could
be deemed safe for autonomous operation. In problem do-
mains where the side effects are undesirable but not safety-
critical, the impact can be minimized by augmenting the
agent’s model with a penalty function corresponding to neg-
ative side effects. This exploits the reliability of the existing
model with respect to the agent’s assigned task, while allow-
ing a deployed agent to adjust its behavior to minimize the
side effects.
In related work (Saisubramanian, Kamar, and Zilberstein
2020), we describe a multi-objective formulation of this
problem with a lexicographic ordering of objectives that pri-
oritizes optimizing the agent’s assigned task (primary objec-
tive) over minimizing negative side effects (secondary ob-
jective). A slack value to the primary objective determines
the maximum allowed deviation from the optimal expected
reward of the primary objective so as to minimize side ef-
fects. This work considers a setting in which the agent has no
prior knowledge about the side effects of its actions, which
may be unobservable by the agent. Information about the
negative side effects is gathered using feedback, which is
then encoded by a reward function. The agent may not be
able to observe the NSE except for the penalty, which is
proportional to the severity of the NSE provided by the feed-
back mechanism. The model is updated with this learned re-
ward function and an updated policy is computed that avoids
negative side effects as much as possible, within the allowed
slack. This formulation can hence handle both avoidable and
unavoidable negative side effects. However this approach is
not suitable for safety-critical consequences since it priori-
tizes optimizing the achievement of the assigned task.
Both these approaches address the side effects associated
with the execution of an action, independent of its outcome.
Constrained optimization Negative side effects occur
when some features of the environment are altered, which
Severity Reversibility Avoidability Frequency Stochasticity Observability Exclusivity
[Hadfield-Mennel et al., 2017] - irreversible - frequent deterministic - -
[Zhang et al., 2018] - irreversible avoidable - deterministic observable non-interfering
[Krakovna et al.,2019] - - avoidable - - observable non-interfering
[Shah et al., 2019] - irreversible avoidable frequent deterministic observable non-interfering
[Zhang et al., 2020] - irreversible - - deterministic observable -
[Turner et al., 2020] - irreversible avoidable frequent deterministic - non-interfering
[Saisubramanian et al., 2020] not safety-critical irreversible - frequent deterministic - non-interfering
Table 2: Summary of the characteristics of the surveyed approaches to mitigating negative side effects. “-” indicates the approach
is indifferent to the values of that property. Although some existing works do not explicitly refer to the severity of the side
effects they can effectively handle, in general these approaches target side effects that are undesirable and significant, but not
safety-critical.
were not expected or intended to be altered. One way to
address this is by constraining the features that can be al-
tered by the agent. Zhang, Durfee, and Singh (2018) con-
sider a factored state representation and characterize nega-
tive side effects as changes in the features of the environ-
ment that may negatively surprise a human observer. This
approach assumes that the agent’s model includes the uncer-
tainty over the desirability of altering a feature and considers
deterministic side effects that are irreversible, but avoidable.
A policy is first computed to reach the goal assuming all
the uncertain features are “locked” for alteration. If a pol-
icy exists, then the agent executes it. If no policy exists, the
agent queries the human to determine which features can be
altered and recomputes a policy. A regret minimization ap-
proach is used to select the top-k features for querying. Re-
cently, the authors extended this approach to identify if the
negative side effects are unavoidable by casting it as a set-
cover problem (Zhang, Durfee, and Singh 2020). If the side
effects are unavoidable, the agent cease operation. There-
fore, these approaches are not suitable for settings where the
agent is expected to alleviate (unavoidable) negative side ef-
fects to the extent possible, while completing its assigned
task.
Minimizing deviations from a baseline Another class of
solution methods defines a penalty function for negative
side effects as a measure of deviation from a baseline state,
based on the features altered. The deviation measure reflects
the degree of disruption to the environment caused by the
agent’s actions. The agent is expected to minimize the dis-
ruption while pursuing its goal, thereby mitigating negative
side effects. A multi-objective formulation with scalariza-
tion has been considered. The agent’s sensitivity to nega-
tive side effects can be adjusted by appropriately tuning the
weights used for scalarization.
Different candidates for baseline states have been pro-
posed, such as start state and inaction in a state, along
with reachability-based metrics to measure the devia-
tion (Krakovna et al. 2019; Shah et al. 2019). The resulting
performance is sensitive to the metric used to calculate devi-
ations, particularly the choice of baseline state. The relative
reachability approach (Krakovna et al. 2019) is not straight-
forward to apply in settings more complex than grid-worlds,
Figure 2: A public repository of negative side effects
as acknowledged by the authors. Attainable utility (Turner,
Hadfield-Menell, and Tadepalli 2020) measures the impact
of side effects as the shifts in the agent’s ability to optimize
for auxiliary objectives, generalizing the relative reachabil-
ity measure. These approaches assume that the agent’s state
representation is sufficient to calculate the deviations and are
therefore not directly applicable to settings with mismatches
between the agent’s state representation and the environ-
ment.
A Repository of Negative Side Effects
Since the problem of negative side effects is an emerging
topic, current research relies on proof-of-concept toy do-
mains for performance evaluation. Moving forward, under-
standing the occurrence of negative side effects in deployed
AI systems is necessary for a realistic formulation of the
problem and to design effective solution approaches to ad-
dress it. To that end, we have created a repository of negative
side effects identified in deployed AI systems1. This pub-
licly available repository is shown in Figure 2. It contains
real-world instances from scientific reports or news articles,
identified by us. For each instance, details such as problem
setting in which negative side effects were observed, a de-
scription of the side effects, location and date of incident, are
provided. We believe this repository will promote a deeper
understanding of the problem, provide insights about which
1http://groups.cs.umass.edu/nse/
assumptions are valid, and facilitate moving beyond simple
grid-world type domains as common test cases to evaluate
techniques.
We invite the readers to contribute to this repository by
reporting cases of negative side effects of deployed AI sys-
tems, based on user experiences, published papers, or media
reports, using an online form we provide2. Each submission
will be reviewed by our team before adding it to the reposi-
tory.
Open Questions and Future Work
We discuss below some key open questions and research di-
rections that can further the understanding of negative side
effects and strategies to mitigate their impacts.
Negative side effects in multi-agent settings: The exist-
ing works have studied the negative side effects of a single
agent’s actions on the environment. In collaborative multi-
agent systems, the agents work together to optimize per-
formance and may have complementary skills. For exam-
ple, the negative side effects produced by an agent may be
reversible by another agent. How can we leverage collab-
orative multi-agent settings to effectively mitigate negative
side effects? One solution approach is to devise a joint pol-
icy to mitigate the negative side effects, in addition to op-
timizing the utility of the assigned task. The existing rich
body of work on cooperative multi-agent systems exam-
ines how the intended effects of each agent’s actions may
affect the other agents when devising a joint policy that
maximizes the performance (Pynadath and Tambe 2002;
Goldman and Zilberstein 2003; Zhang and Lesser 2007;
Ramakrishnan et al. 2019). Extending such frameworks to
handle the side effects problem requires knowledge about
the negative side effects of each agent’s actions and how it
affects the behavior and rewards of other agents in the en-
vironment. External feedbacks may indicate the occurrence
of negative side effects as a result of a joint action of the
agents. Effectively mitigating the side effects requires mech-
anism design for precise identification of the agent whose
actions produce these undesirable effects, based on the feed-
back provided for joint actions.
Addressing side effects in partially observable settings:
In partially observable settings, an agent operates based on
a belief distribution over the states. The problem is further
complicated when the agent has no prior knowledge of the
side effects, which may be partially observable or unob-
served. How can an agent effectively learn to avoid negative
side effects in partially observable settings? Due to partial
observability, the agent maps the external feedbacks indicat-
ing the occurrence of negative side effects to a belief distri-
bution and not an exact state. As a result, a belief distribution
may be associated with multiple conflicting feedbacks. De-
pending on how the feedback signals are aggregated, differ-
ent types of agent behavior emerges with varying sensitivity
to negative side effects.
Expanding agent state representation: An agent’s state
representation may only include features necessary to per-
2https://forms.gle/5MLZ7XMc9FzbDaoW7
form its assigned task. This limitation in state representation
potentially affects the process of learning to avoid negative
side effects. How to design models with sufficiently expres-
sive state representation? Building more realistic simulators
for training agents (Dosovitskiy et al. 2017) and updating
the agent’s model, including expanding its state representa-
tion based on raw sensor data, are promising directions to
overcome this problem.
Human-agent collaboration: Human-agent collaboration
is especially useful when the negative side effects affect
the agent’s ability to complete its task, limited state repre-
sentation affects the agent’s ability to learn to avoid side
effects, or when the side effects are severe. Active user
involvement beyond providing feedbacks, such as taking
over the control from the agent (Ramakrishnan et al. 2019;
Zilberstein 2015) or modifying the environment (Randløv
2000) to facilitate agent learning and operation, may avoid
negative side effects. When to ask the user for help, without
excessively relying on them? There are some recent efforts in
identifying when to transfer the control to a human, when the
agent is incapable of completing its task (Zilberstein 2015)
or to overcome the blind spots of the system (Ramakrishnan
et al. 2019).
Combination of side effects: Many of the recent AI sys-
tems, such as autonomous vehicles, are comprised of mul-
tiple entities that function together to achieve a goal. Each
of these entities may contribute to different forms of nega-
tive side effects. It is likely that multiple forms of negative
side effects, with varying impacts and severity, co-exist and
require different solution techniques to mitigate the overall
impact. How to ensure that approaches designed to elim-
inate one form of side effect do not introduce new risks?
This problem is related to avoiding negative side effects in
collaborative multi-agent settings since each component can
be treated as an agent collaborating with other agents. Rea-
soning about multiple forms of risks together is a corner-
stone in achieving safe AI systems. One approach is to eval-
uate the effects of an impact regularizer on other modules
in the system that interact with the module of interest. This
requires broad background knowledge about the architec-
ture and functionality of each component, which may not
be available in systems with black-box components.
Skill discovery to mitigate negative side effects: Skill dis-
covery (Eysenbach et al. 2018; Konidaris and Barto 2009)
in reinforcement learning allows an agent to discover use-
ful new skills autonomously. High-level skills or options are
temporally extended courses of actions that generalize prim-
itive actions of an agent. These closed-loop policies speed up
planning and learning in complex environment and are gen-
erally used in hierarchical methods for reasoning. Exploring
the feasibility of skill discovery for avoiding negative side
effects is an interesting direction that could accelerate agent
behavior adaptation, especially to avoid side effects during
agent exploration. For example, if the agent learns to push
a box without scratching the walls or dirtying the rug, this
option is useful in a variety of related settings and enables
faster behavior adaptation.
Related problems: This article has discussed the undesir-
able side effects in the context of safety and control in au-
tonomous systems. AI systems may suffer from other fac-
tors that affect their reliability, such as biases and privacy
concerns. Amplifying underlying biases in a system or in-
creased vulnerability to attacks may occur when the sys-
tem optimizes incorrect or incompletely specified objec-
tives, which can be treated as serious side effects that re-
quire entire model redesign. There are growing efforts in
the machine learning community to address many forms of
biases and to improve the security for safeguarding against
adversarial attacks (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016;
Barocas et al. 2017; Gleave et al. 2019; Peng et al. 2019).
Conclusion
This article examines the concept of negative side effects
of AI systems and offers a comprehensive overview of re-
cent research efforts to address the challenges presented by
side effects. In doing so, we aim to advance the general un-
derstanding of this nascent but rapidly evolving area. We
present a taxonomy of negative side effects, discuss the key
challenges in avoiding side effects, and summarize the cur-
rent literature on this topic. We also present potential future
research directions that are aimed at deepening the under-
standing of the problem. While some of these issues can be
addressed using problem-specific or ad-hoc solutions, devel-
oping general techniques to identify and mitigate negative
side effects will facilitate the design and deployment of more
robust and trustworthy AI systems.
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